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1 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
Contrary to Labor Commission Rule as well as Germer's specific discovery requests, 
Famous Dave's withheld notice of the specific affirmative defense it actually intended to 
litigate, along with its supporting witness and photographs until well after every deadline 
in the case had lapsed. Notwithstanding Famous Dave's multiple violations of the 
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commission's own rules, the ALJ allowed the testimony, photographs and previously 
undisclosed affirmative defense over Germer's objection and without providing Germer 
the opportunity to rebut. The ALJ, and later the Labor Commissioner, then denied 
Germer worker's compensation benefits based primarily on the surprise evidence. In so 
doing, the Labor Commission violated Germer's basic constitutional right to due process 
At the same time, the Labor Commission erroneously applied the Allen test to the 
remaining Findings of Fact and undisputed evidence. Instead of considering the totality 
of the circumstances as required by law in determining legal causation, the commission 
embraced a "freeze frame" analysis of Germer's accident until it had isolated each and 
every aspect of the industrial accident in order to deny legal causation. Finally, Ms. 
Germer was not only denied her due process rights to address the actual issues presented 
at hearing, but she was also denied proper legal analysis of her accident and had to wait 
two years for the Labor Commission to affirm its ALJ's erroneous actions. 
L THE LABOR COMMISSION VIOLATED GERMER'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS WHEN IT ADMITTED EVIDENCE THAT HAD 
BEEN IMPROPERLY WITHHELD PRIOR TO THE HEARING. 
The Labor Commission acted outside its statutory authority and denied Germer her 
due process rights to notice when it allowed Famous Dave's to offer testimony and 
photographs which had not been properly disclosed pursuant to Labor Commission Rule. 
While Famous Dave's correctly argues that the Labor Commission is not bound by 
formal rules or procedure, the plain terms of the statute are not without limitation. Utah 
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Code Ann. §34A-2-802("the commission... is not bound by.. . technical or formal rules 
or procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the commission. 
. ."(emphasis added); Labor Commission Rule 602-2-1, entitled "Pleadings and 
Discovery." 
A. Famous Dave's Did Not Comply with Labor Commission Rule Governing Pleadings 
and Discovery and the Labor Commission Permitted It. 
From beginning to end, Famous Dave's flaunted Labor Commission Rule to Germer's 
detriment and the Labor Commission permitted it. In its Answer, Famous Dave's offered 
a boilerplate statement challenging legal causation. It did not identify any specific 
affirmative defense, such as an argument that the cooler door did not stick. Yet Rule 
602-2-1(C)(2) requires all affirmative defenses be stated with "sufficient accuracy and 
detail that the petitioner and the Division may be folly informed of the nature and 
substance of the defenses asserted." As such, Germer was prepared to address a general 
legal causation defense at hearing. She was not prepared to rebut Famous Dave's 
specific challenge as to whether the walk-in cooler door was sticking at the time of her 
accident as that had not been identified by Famous Dave's as a legitimate issue. 
In response to Germer's specific interrogatories requesting identification of witnesses, 
the substance of their knowledge, and impeachment witnesses, Famous Dave's responded 
that it had no information and that it would supplement its answers "at least 45 days prior 
to the evidentiary hearing." Likewise, Famous Dave's asserted that no photographs 
involving Germer's claim existed in response to Germer's specific request for production 
of documents. Famous Dave's filed its Pretrial Disclosures after the 45-day deadline 
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established by Rule 602-2-1(I)(3) with no change or supplementation of its discovery 
responses. At that time, Famous Dave's did not identify Mr. Morton, or any other 
manager at Famous Dave's, as a witness. Famous Dave's did not identify photographs to 
be introduced at trial. Neither did Famous Dave's elaborate on its general legal causation 
defense. 
No further discovery or disclosures are permitted by Labor Commission Rule 602-2-1 
without first obtaining permission from the ALJ. See Rule 602-2-l(F)(6)("If a hearing 
has been scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days prior to the 
hearing unless leave of the administrative law judge is obtained."); Rule 602-2-
l(I)(3)(requiring pretrial disclosures be submitted no later than 45 days prior to hearing). 
Notwithstanding the Rule, and without leave of court, Famous Dave's then filed 
"Supplemental Pretrial Disclosures" identifying for the first time Mr. Morton as a witness 
and photographs of the walk-in cooler it intended to offer into evidence. 
At no point prior to hearing did Famous Dave's comply with Rule 602-2-1(I)(3) 
requiring identification of "the specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to 
litigate" with respect to the purpose of Morton's testimony and photographs. Instead of 
putting Germer on notice as to the basis of its new affirmative defense, Famous Dave's 
indicated in amended Answers to Interrogatories filed the same day as the Supplemental 
Pretrial Disclosures that Mr. Morton would testify as a lay witness "regarding the nature 
of restaurant's walk-in cooler, cooler door operation, and he will provide a lay-out of the 
walk-in cooler." 
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Based upon the testimony Famous Dave's elicited from Morton at hearing, there can 
be no question that Famous Dave's intended to launch a specific affirmative defense that 
the cooler door did not stick rather than rely on its stated general challenge to the legal 
causation of Germer's injuries. With respect to the newly-identified photographs, 
Famous Dave's never did supplement is answers to Germer's previous formal request for 
production of photographs.1 
This is not fair disclosure of the actual specific affirmative defense Famous Dave's 
intended to put on. Famous Dave's acted with utter disregard of multiple provisions of 
Labor Commission Rule. The ALJ was aware of this and admitted the surprise evidence 
anyway. He went on to rely on that evidence for the purpose of denying Germer's 
workers' compensation claim and the Labor Commissioner affirmed. The Commission's 
failure to enforce its own rules under these circumstances stretches beyond its statutory 
authority to relax the rules of evidence and procedure and swallows the limits of due 
process. 
B. The Admission of the Surprise Evidence Was Contrary to Law, Labor Commission 
Rule, and Prejudicial to Germer and Violated Her Due Process Rights. 
Famous Dave's defends the commission's admission of the evidence based on two 
internally contradictory premises. On one hand, Famous Dave's argues that it "was not 
obligated... to inform Ms. Germer of each and every bit and piece of testimony to be 
solicited from a witness at the evidentiary hearing." Appellee's brief at 31 - 32. This is 
1
 Contrary to Famous Dave's assertion that the photographs were available for Germer to review, 
the photographs did not exist until Mr. Morton took them "just over a week" prior to the hearing. 
Tr., 104. 
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not so. Labor Commission Rule makes explicit the continuing obligation of the parties 
to promptly disclose information that has been properly requested. Rule 602-2-1(F)(1). 
In this case photographs, identification of witnesses and the substance of their testimony, 
as well as impeachment evidence were directly requested in formal interrogatories and 
requests to Famous Dave's. Similarly, Famous Dave's was under a direct obligation in 
both the Answer and Pretrial Disclosure phases to identify the specific issues it actually 
intended to litigate. 
On the other hand, Famous Dave's argues that Germer "should have known [] that 
Famous Dave's would call Mr. Morton, or other manager, to testify regarding the 
operation of the cooler door." Appellee's brief at 32. In support of its argument that 
there was no unfair surprise, Famous Dave's carefully asserts that it disclosed "the 
subject matter" or "the substance o f Mr. Morton's testimony via telephone conversation 
between counsel for the parties. Appellee's brief at 6 ("The subject matter of Mr. 
Morton's testimony was discussed. . ."; Appellee's brief at 13 ("The subject matter of 
Mr. Morton's testimony was discussed.. ."); Appellee's brief at 33 ("The substance of 
Mr. Morton's testimony" was fairly disclosed prior to hearing.) There are a myriad of 
problems with this assertion. 
First, there is no reason Germer should have expected Famous Dave's to call Morton 
or any other manager as a witness when it made no such indication until three weeks 
prior to trial that it intended to do so. Second, the telephone conversation Famous Dave's 
relies on to argue that it fairly conveyed the substance of Morton's testimony has no basis 
in evidence. Indeed, Famous Dave's sets forth this telephone conversation, and a 
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spectacularly vague statement of its purported contents, in Paragraph 24 of its Statement 
of Facts without citation to the record. This is because there is no evidentiary record 
establishing the facts of this conversation.2 
The essence of Famous Dave's arguments is that Germer should not have relied on 
the explicit procedure established by Labor Commission Rule. And Famous Dave's offer 
a corollary proposition that Germer had an affirmative duty to chase every veiled nuance 
subsumed by Famous Dave's partial disclosures made after every deadline had lapsed. 
Contrary to Famous Dave's assertion, the commission's admission and consideration of 
the surprise evidence was significantly prejudicial to Germer. The Labor Commission 
based the bulk of its Allen analysis on its finding that the cooler door was not stuck. In 
this case, the labor commission denied Ms. Germer her due process rights to notice and a 
fair hearing and then denied her worker's compensation benefits on this surprise 
evidence. This is contrary to Labor Commission Rule, statutory authority, and the due 
process clause of the Utah Constitution. Germer respectfully requests that the 
Commission's decision be reversed, that the evidence as it relates to the testimony of Mr. 
Morton be excluded, and that the matter be remanded for consideration in accordance 
with Germer's due process rights. In the alternative, Germer requests that she be 
provided the opportunity to present evidence to challenge Mr. Morton's testimony and 
have full answers to her previously propounded discovery. 
2
 Famous Dave's use of this unsupported assertion in the Statement of Facts is contrary to Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7) which requires that "all statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record " and is therefore not 
properly before this Court. 
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EL THE LABOR COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY 
ALLEN TO THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Aside from the due process issues surrounding the commission's admission of 
surprise evidence, the balance of Germer's appeal is that the labor commission erred in 
the manner which it applied the Allen test.3 Rather than consider the totality of the 
circumstances with regard to Germer's industrial accident, the commission deconstructed 
Germer's accident in a "freeze frame" fashion, isolating the mechanism of the accident as 
the simple act of kicking a door and then determining that Germer did not satisfy the 
Allen test However, the clear legal authority requires the labor commission to consider 
legal causation under Allen in the actual context of the industrial accident. See Stouffer 
Foods Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 183 (Utah Ct App. 1990); and 
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm % 752 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 
164 P.3d 384 (Utah 2007) the court distinguished between legal questions and mixed 
questions of law and fact. The court said that "mixed questions of law and fact generally 
arise when the applicability of the legal rule turns on the combination of present facts" 
and asks "whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law." Id. 
at 392 (internal quotations omitted). Legal determinations, on the other hand, are "rules 
3
 Famous Dave's devotes; a significant portion of its brief to defending the commission's factual findings. However, 
Germer has not challenged the commission's factual findings except to the extent the commission relied on the 
surprise evidence discussed in Section I. Therefore, Famous Dave's arguments with respect to marshalling the 
evidence and the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's factual findings are misplaced. Moreover, because 
Germer's appeal does not challenge the underlying undisputed facts, but rather the commission's legal conclusions 
drawn from the facts, she is not required to marshal the evidence. Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Comm 'n9 191 P.3d 
1252, 1255 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008). 
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or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar 
circumstances." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Certainly the majority of appeals 
surrounding application of the Allen test have to do with whether the facts presented fall 
within the legal causation rule enunciated by Allen. However, Germer's argument in this 
case is that the Labor Commission erred when it failed to consider the totality of the 
circumstances in applying the Allen test, which is an established principle to be uniformly 
applied to analyzing whether a particular industrial accident involves an unusual and 
extraordinary exertion. 
As such, Germer respectfully submits that as a matter of law, the Labor Commission 
may not apply the Allen test without considering the totality of the circumstances and the 
appropriate standard of review in this instance is for correction of error. In Acosta v. 
Labor Comm'/?, 44 P.3d 819, 822 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), this court said, "The Allen test is 
a judicially crafted rule that the Commission is in no better position to interpret than this 
court," and reviewed the Commission's interpretation of Allen with regard to 
asymptomatic preexisting conditions for correctness. Likewise, the Commission is in no 
better position to interpret the Allen test outside the actual context of an industrial 
accident and is not at liberty to do so. 
Famous Dave's cites no legal authority for deconstructing an industrial accident 
before applying the Allen test. Contrary to Famous Dave's assertion, and the 
Commissioner's conclusions, Germer was not just "kicking a door." However, Famous 
Dave's argues that the mechanism of the accident was just that and that consideration of 
anything else in the context in which Germer kicked the door is mere distraction. But 
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that is what the laiw requires and neither Famous Dave's nor the Labor Commission 
addressed how its deconstruction of the mechanism of the accident could comply with 
established law for properly determining legal causation. The Commission's application 
of Allen in this respect was erroneous. 
For the same reasons, however, the Commission's failure to consider the totality of 
the circumstances in applying the Allen test does not pass muster under a reasonable and 
rational standard of review either. The relevant issue here is whether the Labor 
Commission's failure to follow longstanding law in its application of Allen in this case is 
reasonable or rational. With the exception of the ALJ's finding that the cooler door did 
not stick, Germer does not challenge the findings of fact and instead argues that a correct 
application of the law to the uncontroverted evidence satisfies legal causation in this case. 
Famous Dave's argues that Germer waived arguments with respect to the fact that 
the floor was wet at the time of Germer's accident as well as the fact that Germer's fall 
tore hardware from her knee. However, these facts were unequivocally set forth in 
Germer's Motion for Review most notably in paragraph 11 of her statement of facts 
where she refers to both the wet floor and the force of her injury at the time of the 
accident. R. at 56-57. In addition to challenging the ALJ's admission of surprise 
evidence, Germer argued that a correct application of the Allen test to the remaining 
findings of fact and undisputed evidence would satisfy Allen whether the cooler door 
stuck or not. Germer could not anticipate that the Labor Commission would fail to 
properly apply the Allen test, but Germer certainly presented those facts, which Famous 
Dave's did not dispute, in its Motion for Review. 
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Finally, Germer notes some discrepancies in Famous Dave's citation to the record in 
its brief. While Famous Dave's generally cites to the record in its Statement of Facts, 
there is a shift in Famous Dave's repeated characterizations of Germer's fall in the body 
of the argument that has no support in the evidentiary record. For instance, Famous 
Dave's asserts that "Ms. Germer's right knee made no direct contact with the door or 
with the floor." Appellee's Brief at 9. Famous Dave's cites to the hearing transcript for 
this proposition. However, this citation does not support this statement. In its response 
to Motion for Review, Famous Dave's cites to the following exchange in the hearing 
transcript to support the same assertion: 
Q: Then your knee comes in contact with the door? 
A: That or the ground, It happened so fast that I honestly don't 
know. I know that when I kicked the door, I was going forward because I 
wouldn't have just kicked it, I would have kicked with my body weight 
going forward." 
Tr., 67-68, see also R at 86. 
However, the ALJ made a finding of fact that Germer "went down on both knees" at 
the time of the accident. This is a finding of fact that neither party disturbed and Famous 
Dave's has waived any argument contrary to the factual findings in this case. 
Similarly, Famous Dave's re-characterizes Germer's accident as if she "slumped" to 
the floor. Again, nowhere is there evidence that Germer slumped to the floor. This is a 
term that Famous Dave's coined in its Response to Motion for Review without citation to 
anything whatsoever. Neither has it cited to anything for that term in Appellee's Brief. 
Germer respectfully submits that the facts are what they are and Famous Dave's is not at 
liberty to re-cast them contrary to the commission's findings or the actual testimony. 
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Had the Labor Commission considered the totality of the circumstances with 
regard to the undisputed facts in this case, the "unusual and extraordinary exertion" test 
would have been satisfied. Because the Labor Commission failed to correctly apply the 
law in this respect, Germer has been prejudiced in the denial of workers' compensation 
benefits for her industrial injury. As such, Germer respectfully requests that this matter 
be reversed and remanded to the Commission for a decision that is in accordance with 
law. 
III. THE TWO YEAR DELAY VIOLATED GERMER'S RIGHTS UNDER OPEN 
COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Germer agrees with Famous Dave's that the delay in resolving cases before the Labor 
Commission is "unfortunate." Under the Open Courts clause of the Utah Constitution, 
Germer has the right to judicial resolution without denial or unnecessary delay. In this 
case, Germer's appeal sat at the Labor Commission for two years only to receive cursory 
review and no analysis of the evidentiary issues or the correct application of the Allen test 
at issue in her case. This is more than unfortunate and Germer respectfully requests that 
this Court hold the Labor Commission accountable for administering the Workers' 
Compensation Act in the manner it was intended. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, Germer respectfully submits that the Labor 
Commission's decision be reversed and remanded for consideration in compliance with 
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established law and that the Labor Commission do so in a timely manner with a date 
certahi 
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